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INTRODOCTION
In recent years social scientists have becc»ie increas*
Ingly concerned with questions of practical significance,
such as warfare and race relations* One resiilt of this
general trend has been a sharp increase in research related
to interpersonal conflict* Most of these studies deal vi^
COTipetitive conflicts, that is, conflicts that are primarily
caused by two or more persons c(xnpeting for the sara* goaXy
^ich only one can attain. In this type of conflict, one
party can attain the desired goal only at the csptnse of the
other party*
However, not all conflicts are necessarily competitive*
lUMient studies by Happoport (1965) and Todd, Hammond audi
Vfilkins (1965) demonstrate that Interpersonal conflicts may
arise when two or more persons who are working for a mutual
goal have different ideas about how to achieve this goal*
Rappoport (1965) suggests tliree conditions which make for
the development of noncompetitive conflicts (1) mutual alms
or goals; (2) uncertainty, and (3) discrepant cojcpiltive
proQQ3SQ8» Uncertainty is required if different viewpoints
or discrepant cognitive processes are to appear plausible*
In order to study this type of interpersonal s^tuatltm
in a controlled laboratory setting, and to stimulate further
research, Hammond (1965) has developed a research paradigm
for the study of cognitive conflict emd its resolution*
2Briefly, the research paradigm creates a situation in which
two persons, who think differently about a problon, are
brought together to work cooperatively on that problem. In
the first stage of the paradigm, subjects receive training
designed to produce cognitive differences. In the second
stage these differences cause the subjects to disagree with
one another when they must arrive at a joint decision. The
paradigm is representative of various conflict situations,
ranging from domestic problems to decisions on foreign policy.
The paradigm was developed in empirical studies by
Hammond and his associates. These studies presented subjects
with probabilistic cue material, according to which they must
judge or estimate values on a covert distal variable. Cues
are differentially weighted so that one cue might be highly
correlated with the distal variable, while the others are
only slightly correlated with the distal variable.
In previous research the problems used have varied,
Rappoport (1965) used geometric figures, where three aspects
of the figures served as cues and the distal variable was a
number ranging from 1-9, An investigation by Todd, Hammond
and Wilkins (1965) used the paradigm to study a hypothetical
political problem. In this study the cues used were state-
ments concerning: (a) the degree of free elections existing
In the nation, and (b) the extent to which state control over
an individual was a factor in the government. On the basis
of these cues, the subjects were required to estimate the
3"level of democratic Institutions" in a given nation.
The results of these studies indicate that the three
important dimensions of cognitive conflict are learning
^
conflict resolution y and cognitive change . It has been
demonstrated that learning goes on in both stages of the
paradigm. Subjects learn to rely on the high validity cue
in the training stage and later in the second eta^e they
learn to shift emphasis to another cue. Disagreements between
subjects working together are resolved either through compro-
mise or capitulation . In the former case, both subjects de-
part from their original private judgments and attempt to
"split the difference." In the latter case, one subject
simply agrees to the judgment of the other. Cognitive change
may occur during the common task as subjects are either in-
fluenced by their partners and/or learn new cue values in
the common task.
Prior research has been concerned with different indepen-
dent variables and their influence on conflict resolution,
Rappoport (1965) studied subjects* cognitive orientation
toward the task. His results show that subjects given an
intuitive set toward their task develop less conflict, and
tend to resolve their conflict by compromise to a greater
extent than subjects given an analytical set. Todd, Hammond,
and Wilkins (1965) studied conflict resolution as a function
of the type of feedback subjects receive; either unambiguous
or ambiguous feedback. They report that there is a greater
tendency to compromise when subjects receive unambiguous
accuracy feedback,
in sum, these studies demonstrate that conflict can
be traced to cognitive differences and, that learning
^
compromise y and cognitive change are the important dimen-
sions of cognitive conflict. Even as these dimensions have
emerged as crucial to the understanding of cognitive conflict,
they have thus far only been studied in experiments that also
treat conflict as a dependent variable. Learning, comprcMnise,
and cognitive change have been identified as important dimen-
sions but they have not been studied systematically as a func-
tion of conflict. It is important to carry out such a syste-
matic study, because previous experiments have been based on
a narrow range of conflict, and individual differences among
subjects have not been investigated. The present study is
based upon quantitatively and qualitatively different types
of conflict. The major dimensions of cognitive conflict will
here be studied as a function of botii the amount of disagree-
ment expressed and the manner in which it is expressed,
DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
Problem
The purpose of this study is to investigate the major
dimensions of cognitive conflict: learning, compromise, and
cognitive change; as a function of different levels and types
5of disagreement. Previous studies have noted these important
dimensions of cognitive conflict, but in this study we spe-
cifically examine these dimensions to determine iioi-i they may
be related to different types and degrees of conflict. Quan-
titative levels of disagreement and modes of expressing dis-
agreement are treated as separate independent variables and
manipulated by employing a confederate.
Task
The study employs a racial intergratlon problem, de-
veloped by Happoport (I966). In his study, the task required
subjects to judge the general level of integration in 30
different communities that were each represented on a M' x 6"
card.
On the face of each card, subjects were given the three
cues shown below:
Specific Levels of Integration in Community
(1) Education Low Below Average Above Average High
(2) Housing Low Below Average Above Average High
(3) ^oh „, ^
Opportunities Low Below Average Above Average High
On the basis of the three cues, thcj -rere to judge the
general level of Integration which exists in the community.
The subjects were to choose one of the nine levels of the
distal variable as shown below:
General Level of Integration in Community
Minimum Above Average
Very Low High
Low Very High
Below Average Maximum
Average
As an example, three cues have been underlined, with
the corresponding correct distal variable underlined, as
based on the following cue validities:
Education .01
Housing -.16 r2 a .85
Job Opportunities .91
These cue validities are arbitrary in that they are
not based on real data concerning communities* racial
integration situation. An earlier study, referred to above,
used this kind of task with these validities and it was found
that subjects learned to rely on the high validity cue well
above chance levels.
In the present study subjects judge the general level
of integration in 20 different communities. On 12 of the
20 cards, called critical cards, the initial disagreement
between the naive subject and the confederate Is predeter-
mined. The confederate is instructed to disagree by certain
fixed amounts. However, on the other eight cards, called
noncritical cards, the confederate always agrees with the
naive subject. These agreement trials were inserted at
various points in the 20 card series to keep the naive subject
from becoming suspicious.
Independent Variables
Conflict is manipulated in instructing the confederate
to show different quantitative levels of disagreement. On
critical cards he disagrees by 2, 3 » or ^ units of the distal
variable. For example, if the level of disagreement is
specified as 2 units of the distal variable and the naive
subject judged the general level of integration to be
minimum T then the confederate's answer would be low .
Various considerations determined the choice of these
three quantitative degrees of conflict. First, it should be
noted that disagreement by one unit of the distal variable
is omitted as being of no fundamental interest. In previous
research it has been observed that subjects who disagree by
such a minimal amount do not perceive this discrepancy be-
tween their judgments as serious. They frequently handle
the discrepancy by agreeing to capitulate to each other on
alternative cards. Moreover, a one unit discrepancy between
their judgments does not give the opportunity to compromise.
Disagreement by 2 units was chosen because it is a relatively
small amount of conflict, but offers a chance for perfect
comprcanise. Each subject can move to a central point; that
is, in the minimum vs, low disagreement subjects may agree
on very j.oy . Disagreement by 3 was chosen because while it
offers a chance for compromise, a perfect compromise cannot
be reached. Here, the only comprcHnise possible requires one
8subject to change his judgment by 2 units and the other to
change by 1 unit. Disagreement by h units was of interest
because it represents an extreme case. In prior research,
discrepancies of this magnitude were seldom observed. The
present study therefore provides an opportunity to explore
effects of extreme disagreement for the first time. A full
range of outcomes are possible here. Perfect compromise can
occur with both subjects altering their judgments by 2 units
of the distal variable. Extreme capitulation can occur if
one subject abandons his own judgment to accept that of his
partner. And unbalanced forms of compromise can occur if
both partners alter their original judgments, but one moves
further than the other.
The second independent variable manipulated is the manner
in which disagreement is expressed. It is quite obvious in
everyday life that persons can express a constant amount of
disagreement in a variety of ways which may either antagonize
or conciliate the other. While it is cleso'ly impossible to
manipulate such relevant factors as tone of voice, emphasis,
facial expressions, and gestures, it was possible to define
expressions of disagreement as either persistent or acquies-
cent. In the persistent condition, the confederate is in-
structed to state his discrepant judgment twice. That is,
regardless of how the naive subject responds to his first
statement, the confederate repeats it a second time. But in
the acquiescent condition the confederate states his discrepant
9judgment only once. The confederate, in both the acquies-
cent and persistent conditions, must eventually agree with
the naive subject. However, in the former case he accepts
the naive subjects* suggestion after one disagreement; in
the latter case he accepts the naive subjects* suggestion
after two disagreements.
Design
The use of a confederate introduces certain methodo-
logical problems. One obvious question that arises concerns
generalizing results beyond the particular confederate used.
In an effort to cope with this problem, the present study
employed two very different confederates; one is a 22 year
old male majoring in Speech; while the other is a 20 year
old female majoring in Psychology. The problem of idio-
syncratic differences restricting the generality of results
is therefore controlled in two ways. First, all results are
averaged across the two different confederates. Second, a
test for the effects of idiosyncratic differences can be made
by comparing results obtained with each confederate separately.
The study is designed so that confederates are counter-
balanced across all conditions of conflict; both quantita-
tive and qualitative. As can be seen in the schematic dia-
gram below, the two confederates each work with five subjects
in the six experimental conditions. (See Figure A).
Both confederates went through a short training period.
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where each memorized a "script." The script specified the
judgments they vere to make and also the words to be used
in making them. As mentioned earlier, it is ultimately
impossible to control every subtle cue put forth by the
confederate, but this type of variance should distribute
itself across the various conditions randomly so as not
to bias results.
Research Plan
In general, naive subjects are paired with a confederate
to work under conditions in which the confederate disagrees
by fixed amounts, and expresses his disagreement in either
a persistent or acquiescent fashion. A 3 x 2 factorial
experiment is employed, with three levels of quantitative
disagreement and two types of expression as independent
variables. Three aspects of cognitive conflict are studied
as dependent variables: (1) learning; (2) conflict resolu-
tion or compromise; and (3) cognitive change.
Measures
Learning is measured in terms of subjects* error scores.
An error is defined as the difference between a given judg-
ment and the correct value of the distal variable being
judged. Error scores are computed for a subjects' first
private judgment, the joint judgment to which he agrees, and
the second private judgment he eventually makes for each card.
11
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Conflict resolution is examined in terms of two measures:
(1) compromise; and (2) yielding. Compromise is measured by-
computing a difference score; which is arrived at by the
formula (Si - J) - (S2 - J); where (Sx - J) is the difference
between the naive subjects* private judgment and the joint
answer to which he agrees, and (S2 - J) is the difference
between the confederates* judgment and the joint judgment
which is agreed upon. A. difference scores of or 1 is
coimted as compromise. Yielding is measured by the formula
(Si - J) which is the difference between a person's private
judgment and the joint judgment to which he agrees. The
higher the score, the greater the amount of capitiaation the
subject has shown in agreeing to a joint answer.
Cogqli^iy^ Change (Si - Sii) is measured by computing
the difference between a subject's first private judgment
(Si) and his second private judgment (Si*). This measure
allows one to detect any change that may occur as a result
of one partner influencing the other and/or the naive subject
learning new cue values during the common task. All of these
measures will be examined as a function of the independent
variables.
Subjects
Sixty undergraduate volunteers were drawn from intro-
ductory Psychology classes. Males and females were used.
In so far as it was possible they were distributed equally
13
across the different experimental conditions, and the dif-
ferent confederates. Each confederate ran 5 subjects In
each condition, and of the 5, 2 were of one sex and 3 were
of the other. Out of the 60 subjects, 32 were male and 28
female. One hour was allotted for testing each pair.
Procedures
Confederate Training . At the outset of the experiment,
both confederates were given a set of instructions and a
brief training period. First, they were always to wait
for the naive subjects' initial judgment. After the naive
subject states his judgment, the confederate, in the
acquiescent condition, must disagree by the predetermined
amount and thereafter he must (1) never repeat his own
judgment; (2) always be noncommittal; and (3) agree with
suggestions of the naive subject. In the persistent condi-
tion the confederate must also disagree by the predetermined
amount. But regardless of how the naive subject responds,
the confederate must then repeat his discrepant judgment.
Once he has repeated himself, he is noncommittal and must
agree with suggestions of the naive subject, (Verbatim
instructions for both conditions are given in appendix A.)
The amount of disagreement expressed by the confederate
was specified in advance, depending upon which experimental
condition was being run. Furthermore, the direction of
disagreement was also specified as follows. On critical
1^
cards, If the naive subjects* first judgment was hl^ (7f
8, or 9) on the distal variable, the confederate always
replied with a judgment that was lower by the predetermined
amount# If the naive subjects' judgmoit on the distal varia-
ble was low, (1, 2, or 3), the confederate always responded
with a judgment that was higher by the predetermined amount*
If the nclv© subject gave a central judgment (^, 5, or 6,) the
confederate would alternate his answer, going higher by the
predetermined amount one time and lower the next time* In
th« high disagreement condition the confederate had a choice
of direction only if the naive subject suggested 5 (Average)
in which case the alternation rule was followed. Otherwise,
the direction was fixed. For Monple, If the naive subjects*
judgment was 6 (Above average) in order for the confederate
to differ by k units on the distal variable, he had to re-
spond 2 {Yery low) as there is no value on the distal variable
higher than Maximum, which is only 3 units higher*
Upon the arrival of the naive subject and confederate,
they were escorted to the experimental room and given instruc-
tions* It was explained to them that the purpose of the ex-
periment is to study the way people make judgments about
racial Integration matters* They were told that the material
had been collected in cities and towns all over the United
States and each card represented a city, however, no informa-
tion would be given as to the name of the city or the section
of the country from \rtiich it was taken* They were told that
it was a novel task and that our aim was to find out how well
people could do when they work together* Their task was to
15
examine the three cues and then estimate the general level
of integration in that community. Both subjects were
instructed to first examine the card individually and write
down a private judgment on their private answer sheets.
Then they could discuss their answers in any manner they
chose in order to arrive at a Joint answer. Their Joint
answer was recorded by E, It was necessary for the confed-
erate to wait for the naive subject to reveal his private
judgment first so that the confederate could disagree by
the predetermined amount. After arriving at a Joint Judg-
ment, they were instructed to once again examine the card
and make a second private Judgment, which they would not
reveal to each other. They were told that this was Just to
get a record of their personal impression. When both sub-
jects had written down a second private Judgment, E turned
the card over and the correct answer was exposed. Then they
were instructed to go on to the next card and repeat the
process until they had completed all 20 cards. (For verbatim
instructions see appendix B.)
The experiment was conducted in a small room which
contained a one-way observation mirror. The subjects were
both seated at one-armed chairs facing E, who was seated
behind a small table, A screen was set up between the sub-
jects which prevented than from seeing each other's private
answer sheets. The room was equipped with a microphone, which
allowed the verbal interactions of the naive subject and the
16
confederate to be tape recorded,
RESULTS
M Conflict Resolution
Compromise,
A 3 X 2 X 2 analysis of variance was planned to compare
the effects of disagreement levels, modes of expressing dis-
agreement, and confederates. However, because the range of
disagreement scores possible in different experimental con-
ditions varies from 2 to ^•, the data were examined to deter-
mine whether they satisfied the homogeneity of variance re-
requirement for parametric analysis. Hartley's maximum - F
test revealed heterogeneity of variance which was corrected
by applying a\
[
x ^ i transformation to the data.
Analysis of variance performed on the transformed
compromise scores shows significant main effects for levels
of disagreement (F2,lf8 " 20,^-8, £ ,001) and modes of ex-
pressing disagreement (F^^ 1^5 " 5.l6, £ .05, See Table 1),
There is no significant effect for confederates and no
significant interaction effects. Individual comparisons
of the mean compromise scores obtained for the three levels
of disagreement were carried out using Fisher's Least Signifi-
cant Difference test (See Table 2), Results show no signifi-
cant difference between compromise scores for the high and
medium disagreement conditions, but both differ significantly
from the mean obtained in the low disagreement condition. It
17
l^ble 1
, of Analysis of Varlanc* of the Mean
ComproBlse Scores (Transformed Data)
Source of Variance SS dP MS f
A (Mode of expressing disagreement .160 1 .160 5.16*
B (Levels of disagreeaent) 1.270 2 .635 20.M^***
C (Confederates) .001 1 .001 N.S.
AB .160 2 .080 N.S.
AC .020 1 .020 H.S.
BC .001 2 .001 N.S.
ABC .025 2 .012 N.S.
tf/Cells 1.^5 h8 .031
Total 3.132 59
1« The within tern was the denominator for all F tests.
P .05
** p .001
18
Table 2
Comparisons of Mean Compromise Scores
(Transformed Data)
Levels of Disagreement High Medium Low
Original Data Means 2.276 2.152 1.20
Transformed Data Means 1.7^-'? 1.7^-^ lA^6
LSD s ,11 Means lying above the same horizontal line are
not significantly different; those over
different lines are.
19
is therefore clear that compromise is maximal when the amount
of disagreement is low and when it is expressed in an acquies-
cent manner.
The compromise data are plotted across the 12 critical
trials in Figures 1 and 2 to show the effect of successive
trials on the two independent variables. Inspection of these
figures shows virtually no trials variance for either levels
or modes of expressing disagreement.
Another aspect of conflict resolution may be termed
yielding or capitulation y that is, the tendency to accept
the others* judgment. Once again, heterogeneity of variance
was suspected because it is possible to obtain different
maximum yielding scores in the high, medium and low disagree-
ment conditions. Hartley's maximum - F test indicated hetero-
geneity which was corrected by again applying a \ x -j- 1
transformation.
An analysis of variance computed on the transformed
yielding scores shows significant main effects for both
levels of disagreement (F2 Ifg 6,5^, j^ ,005) and modes
of expressing disagreement (Fm-g " 27.31, R ,001j See
Table 3)« Application of Fisher's Least Significant Dif-
ference test indicates no significant difference between
yielding scores in the medium and high disagreement conditions,
but both of these conditions produce significantly higher
yielding scores than the low disagreement condition (See
Table h). Mean yielding scores for the three disagreement
20
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Table 3
Simmarv of Analysis of Variance of the Mean
Yielding Scores (Transformed Data)
Source of Variance SS dF MS F
A (Mode of expressing disasreement) .71 1 .71 27.31****
B (Levels of disagreement) .3^ 2 .17 6.5^***
C (Confederates) .05 1 .05 N.S.
AB .03 2 .015 N.S.
AC .00 1 .00 N.S.
EC .00 2 .00 N.S,
ABC .06 2 .03 N.S.
W/Cells 1.23 hS .026
Total 2.^2 59
1. The within term was used for all F tests,* p .001
*** p .005
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Table h
Comparisons of Mean Yielding Scores
(Transformed Data)
Levels of Disagreement
Means of Original Data
Transformed Data Means
Medium High Low
1.862 1.699 1.2^-2
1,6?0 it?90 1A70
LSD ,10 Means lying above the same horizontal line are not
significantly different; those over different
lines are*
2\
conditions (transformed data) are plotted across the 12
critical trials in Figure 3» Figure h shows the mean
yielding scores (transformed data) for the two modes of
expression for the 12 critical trials. Inspection of the
two figures indicates little trial variance occurred.
Cognitive Change.
Subjects' cognitive change scores, that is, the dif-
ference between their first and second private judgments on
each critical trial, were also subjected to a 3 x 2 x 2
analyses of variance (See Table 5)» The only significant
F ratio obtained is for the main effect of disagreement
levels (F2 J+8 " 7»76, p_ .005). Fisher »s Least Significant
Difference test shows that cognitive change is significantly
greater in the medium disagreement condition than in either
the low or the high disagreement conditions (See Table 6).
The latter two conditions produce no significantly different
effects on cognitive change. Data for the three disagree-
ment groups are plotted across trials in Figure 5. Examina-
tion of Figure 5 shows that after the first two critical
trials, cognitive change is consistently highest in the
medium disagreement condition. However, the data plotted
on the last two trials suggests an interaction bet\/een trials
and disagreement conditions. Further analysis were carried
out on the data for these two trials (19 and 20, see Table 7).
Fisher's Least Significant Difference test shows a signifi-
cantly greater amount of cognitive change occurred in the
25
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Table 5
Analysis of Variance of Mean
Cognitive Change Scores
Source of Variance SS dF MS F
A (Modes of expressing disagreement) .ifS 1 M N.S.
B (Levels of disagreement 2.63 2 1.32 7.76***
C (Confederates) .23 1 .23 W.S.
AB .18 2 .09 N.S.
AC .11 1 .11 N.S.
BC .09 2 .0^5 N.S.
ABC .^ 2 .02 N.S.
SS w/Cells 7.95 ifS .17
Total 11.71 59
1.. The within term was the denominator for
** £ .005
all F tests.
28
• Table 6
Ccanparisons of Mean Cognitive Change Scores
Levels of Disagreement 3 2 V
Means 1.308 .917 .825
LSD* • .26 Means lying above the same horizontal line are
not significantly different; those over
different lines are.
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FIG. 5. MEAN COGNITIVE CHANGE SCORES OBTAINED
IN THE THREE DISAGREEMENT CONDITIONS
PLOTTED AS A FUNCTION OF CRITICAL
TRIALS.
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Table 7
Analysis of Variance of Cognitive Change Scores
for the Last Two Trials (11 & 12)
Source of Variance dF SS MS
Levels of disagreement 2 7.06 3.53 10.09****
Error 57 19.69 .35
Total 59 26.75
1, The within term was the dencaninator for all F tests,
**** m 2 .001
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medium and low condition than in the high disagreement
condition (See Table 8). While the medium disagreement
condition still shows the greatest amount of cognitive
change, it is not significantly different from the low con-
dition«
Learning,
Error scores based on the discrepancy betv/een each
subject's Judgment and the correct value of the distal
variable being judged were computed for all critical trials.
Three different scores were obtained for each subject; errors
associated with his first private judgment; the joint judg-
ment to which he agreed; and his second private judgment.
Analysis of variance carried out on the error scores of the
two private judgments show no significant main effects or
interactions. Analysis of joint judgment errors, shown in
Table 9, however, reveals a significant main effect for
disagreement levels (F2,lf8 " 3»67, R •05)» No significant
effects were found for modes of expression or confederates
and there were no significant interactions. Application of
Fisher's Least Significant Difference test to the disagree-
ment levels data demonstrates that the variance here is
mainly due to the difference betv/een error scores in the high
and low disagreement conditions (See Table 10), Subjects in
the high condition make significantly greater errors than
subjects in the low condition. Errors in the medium condition
are not significantly different from those made in either
32
Table 8
Comparison of Mean Cognitive Change Scores
(Last two trials)
Levels of disagreement Mediim Low High
Means 1.^7^ 1.10 .^O
LSD* s .39 Means lying above the same horizontal line are
not significantly different, those over
different lines are.
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Table 9
Error Scores on Joint Judgment
klJL
Source of Variance
A (Mode of expressing disagreement) .3^ 1 .3»f 2.27^'^'
B (Levels of disagreement) 1.10 2 .55 3.67*
C (Confederates) .21 1 .21 N.S.
AB
.38 2 .19 N.S.
AC v;.': .01 1 .01 N.S.
BC .20 2 .10 N.S.
ABC .^0 2 .20 N.S.
W/Cells 7.16 ^8 .15
Total 9.80 59
1. The within term was used for all F tests.
*
- (£ .05)
Table 10
Comparisons of Mean Error Scores on
Joint Judgment
3^
Levels of disagreement ^5 2
Mean 2.09'? 1.87P 1.770
LSD* = .25 Means lying above the same horizontal line are
not significantly different; those over
different lines are.
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the high or low conditions.
Mean error scores for each disagreement condition are
plotted across the 12 critical trials in Figure 6, Examina-
tion again indicates no systematic trial variance.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In general the results of this study demonstrate that
variations in both quantity and quality of disagreement had
Important effects on the major dimensions of cognitive con-
flict.
Before discussing specific findings, it should be noted
that none of our results indicate an important confederates
effect. And this point is all the more striking because the
confederates were deliberately selected as very different
types. Various reasons may explain why the anticipated con-
federate artifact did not materialize. The two students
serving as confederates were highly motivated; seriously
interested in the research. They were carefully rehearsed
in the procedures pertaining to the different experimental
conditions, but qsl attempt was made to inhibit their natural
social styles. Furthermore, because the structure of the
task was such that confederates were only required to role-
play on intermittent trials, it is likely that idiosyncratic
factors did not have cumulative effects. The spacing of
critical trials may also explain the absence of any general
trials effect. It may of course be argued that two confederates
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FIG. 6 MEAN ERROR SCORES OBTAINED IN THE
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do not make a popiiLatlon, even if they are extremely dif-
ferent frcan one another* However, while it cannot be denied
that the use of additional confederates woiild have strength-
ened the design, the fact that confederate effects nowhere
approach significance offers strong support for the generality
of the results*
Results show very clearly that compromiae occ^xrs most
frequently whoa disagreement is low anA mxpressed in an
acquiescent manner* The relative degree to which these
tifD variables influence comprcxnise may be assessed by la*
specting the levels of significance in Table 1* The level
of significance for modes of expression is •05 vrtiile the level
of significance for levels of disagreement is •001* Thus,
while both are significant determinants of compromise, the
quantitative degree of disagreeffl^it appears much more im-
portant than the persistence with which it is expressed*
Observations of subject's behavior during the experiment
suggest a straightforward explanation for these findings*
Iteiy naive subjects reacted to the initial disagreement on
critical tarials by re-evaluating their own Judgment and offer-
ing to modify it* The only reasonable modification possible
in the low disagreement condition is to change by one unit
of the distal variable in the directirai of the confederate*
Such a one unit change puts them at the perfect compToalsQ
point, i'^irthermore, it will be recalled that the acquiescent
condition requires confederates to agree with the naive S
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after the initial statement of disagreement. Subjects*
tendency to reevaluate their positions taken together with
restraints of the research design therefore provide an
economical explanation for the maximum compromise result.
The above interpretation also fits the data obtained
in the medium disagreement condition quite well: no perfect
compromise point is available to subjects here and less com-
promise is found. But, if the suggested explanation is
correct, why should compromise not be high in the high dis-
agreement condition? Both the low and high conditions
present perfect comprcMnise points. The only explanation
for this difference that is consistent with the general in-
terpretation above is that while naive subjects re-evaluate
and offer to change their judgment by one unit quite easily,
they are more reluctant to change by two units. Furthermore,
£ often noted that subjects would look upon a two unit (low)
disagreement as plausible, but would greet a four unit (high)
disagreement with remarks of surprise or astonishment. It
seems obvious that compromise cannot be predicted simply
according to the availability of perfect compromise points.
Empirical evidence for this interpretation was sought
by examining the cognitive change scores discussed below.
If the interpretation suggested here is correct and subjects
genuinely re-evaluate their initial private judgments when
disagreements occur, then such re-evaluations should lead to
cognitive change. Our interpretation suggests that cognitive
39
change would be greater in the low than in the high dis-
agreement condition. The mean cognitive change scores for
low, medium and high conditions are .917, 1.308, and ,825
respectively. This is in support of the above interpreta-
tion although the difference between the high and low condi-
tion is not significant.
Inspection of Figure 5 shows immediately that cognitive
change is maximum in the medium disagreement condition. The
obvious explanation for this finding, especially when it is
coupled with the finding that change scores in the high and
low disagreement conditions appear almost identical, must
be in terms of an assimilation-contrast phenomenon. Research
concerning attitude change has demonstrated that change can
be seen as a function of the discrepancy of the change
messages from the position of the subject. Thus Hovland,
Harvey, and Sherif (1957) found subjects whose own stand
diverged widely from that advocated in conmiunication per-
ceived the communication as further removed from their own
stand than it was (contrast effect). They also report that
subjects whose own stands are close to the position advo-
cated perceive the cranmunication as closer to their own
position than it was (assimilation effect). In the high
disagreement condition, there is little cognitive change
because subjects apparently contrast the confederate's
judgment with their own. In the low condition, it seems
reasonable to suppose that the discrepancy appeared small
ko
enough for it to be assimilated to the naive subject's own
judgment. But in the medium disagreement condition subjects
apparently perceive the confederate's judgment both as dif-
ferent from their own and plausible, hence cognitive change
is greatest in this condition.
No differences were found between the two modes of ex-
pressing disagreement for cognitive change scores. It would
thus appear that persistence exhibited by the coiifederate
has no effect on the cognitive change of the naive subject.
The finding that subjects vield to the confederate less
in the low condition than in either the medium or high dis-
agreement condition, also can be related to experimental
constraints. In the low disagreement condition it is only
possible for subjects to obtain a yielding score of 2, while
the possible scores are 3 and k in the medium and high dis-
agreement conditions. However, if the results here were
entirely due to experimental constraints, we would expect
to find the greatest yielding in the high condition. Instead,
we find maximum yielding in the medium disagreement condition.
An inspection of Figure h shows that there is much more
yielding in the persistent condition than the acquiescent
condition. In sum, maximum yielding occurred in the persis-
tent condition where disagreement was either medium or high.
Hence in the face of high persistent disagreement, subjects
apparently tend to resolve their conflict in the easiest
manner, by simply yielding to the confederate.
hi
One general point should be made concerning the compro-
mise and yielding measures. As was mentioned earlier, there
is a chance for higher yielding and greater difference scores
to appear in the high disagreement condition. However, it
is also possible for them to be low. Evidence for this pos-
sibility can be found in Figures 1 and 3, Data plotted here
make it clear that on the compromise measure there is little
difference between the medium and high disagreement condition.
While for the yielding data, the mean in the high condition
is lower than in the medium condition. The data therefore
do not indicate that all the findings are an artifact of the
response range available to subjects.
To study learning, error scores were computed for the
subjects' first private judgment, his joint judgment, and
his second private judgment. No significant differences
were found except on the error scores for joint judgments:
errors were greatest in the high disagreement condition and
lowest in the low disagreement condition. Large disagree-
ments therefore appear to have a negative effect on per-
formance of the joint task. But since no differences were
found for error scores on the second private judgment, it
is clear that subjects were agreeing to judgments which they
thought were incorrect. In general then, none of the results
obtained here indicate a genuine relationship between learn-
ing and conflict. This is rather surprising, because it was
assumed that the presence of a persistently disagreeing partner
k2
would impede learning. It can only be concluded that
subjects were able to maintain the integrity of their
private learning processes despite the interference created
by the confederate.
An additional surprising outcome of this study is that
nowhere were any significant effects for trials observed.
It was thought at the outset, that as high disagreement
trials progressed, subjects would either become rebellious
and completely reject the position of the confederate, or
else they would lose interest and simply capitulate to the
confederate. But none of the data plots indicate any syste-
matic trials variance except for the last two trials on the
cognitive change measure; and this is quite small. As was
mentioned before, perhaps the spacing of critical trials
restricted any trial variance.
Conclusions
The findings of this study show that both the amount
of disagreement and the manner in which it is expressed
have important effects on how subjects will behave in a
cooperative Judgment situation. When disagreements are
small they are easily resolved through ccanpromise. But
larger, persistent disagreements are resolved by following
a line of least resistance: yielding to the persistent
partner. Results clearly indicate, however, that such yield*
ing is a superficial psychological phenomenon. It is not
h3
accompanied by cognitive change nor is it related to subjects*
ability to learn the task.
These conclusions must obviously be qualified by the
degree to which subjects see the task as personally important.
It is presumed that the findings of the present study might
have been quite different if the consequences of subjects*
joint judgments involved something more serious than a
potential cash reward.
jii;
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APPENDIX A
Ihstructions Given to Confederates For
Conflict Expressions
.:.:: r\_
h7
Acquiescent Condition
The confederate must do only one thing: After the
naive subject makes his private judgment, the confederate
must disagree by the predetermined amount and then there-
after $
must (1) Never repeat his own judgment
(2) Always be noncommittal
Qk) Agree with suggestions of naive subject, but
-''' agreement should not be suggestive.
Exchange of private judgments between naive subject
and confederate.
Naive subject Confederate
(A) Repeats first judgment (A) Agrees
(B) Asks for information or (B) Reflects: is noncommittal,
confederate's reasoning. Doesn't repeat own judgment.
If direct question by naive
S asking stooge to repeat
judgment; Stooge doesn't—
forgot, not important, etc,
(C) Agrees with stooge or may (C) Stooge agrees— o.k,
suggest compromise
Persistent Disagreement Condition
In this condition the stooge must here give his own
judgment twice and thereafter be noncommittal or agree.
Naive subject Confederate
(A) Repeats own judgment (A) Stooge repeats own judgment
(1) Could agree with stooge
END
(2) Could suggest compro- (2) Agree
mise or repeat own •
judgment again
^8
(3) Could ask stooge for
information
(B) Asks for information
or discussion.
(C) Suggests a compromise
after first disagreement
with stooge,
(1) Naive could agree
(2) Could ask reason
(3) Repeats compromise
(3) Reflects: is noncommittal.
Doesn't repeat ovm Judg-
ment. If direct question
by naive S asking stooge
to repeat J; Stooge
doesn't—forgot, not
important, etc.
(B) Stooge repeats own judgment
with statement "I just
thought it was a good
answer" or something.
Then he is noncommittal,
(C) Repeats own judgment.
(2) Stooge must be noncommittal,
(3) Stooge agrees.
APPENDIX B
Instructions Given to Each Subject
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Instructions
We are doing an experiment to see how well people can
judge racial integration matters. On the basis of research
conducted in different communities throughout the country,
it has been found that the general level of integration that
exists in a community can be predicted according to the level
of integration that exists in three specific areas; Education,
Housing, and Jobs*
You will be given the level of integration that exists
in the three specific areas as shown here: (E shows card to
Ss).
Your task is to make a Judgment as to what the general
level of integration is in this community by choosing from
among the nine following general levels, (# shows Ss the
nine levels).
Because this is a novel task and people often do better
if they work together, you will work together on this task.
Now here is the way you are to proceed. After examining
the three specific levels of integration, you are to make your
own personal judgment of the general level of integration.
Then you and your partner will be allowed to reach a joint
judgment of the general level of integration.
Before we turn the card over and let you see the correct
answer we want you to make a second private (personal) judg-
ment of the general level of integration. (This is just to
get a record of your second personal impression)
•
Your performance will be evaluated in terms of your
joint judgment. Its to your advantage to do as well as
possible as the two most accurate subjects will be given a
cash prize.
Scoring Explanation
Now the way we are scoring your performance is as follows!
If your judgment is correct you will be given 2 points for
that card. If your joint judgment is off by one number you
will be given 1 point. At the conclusion of the 20 cards,
your score will be added and the pair of Ss with the largest
number of points will win the cash prize ($10.00)
•
COMPROMISE, LEARNING AND COGNITIVE CHANGE AS A
FUNCTION OF INDUCED COGNITIVE CONJ'LICT
by
RICHARD EARL WHARTON
B, A., University of Arizona, 196M-
AN ABSTRACT OF A THESIS
submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
MASTER OF SCIENCE
Department of Psychology
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas
1966
The general purpose of this research was to investigate
major dimensions of cognitive conflict i.e., learning,
compromise, and cognitive change, as a function of different
levels and types of disagreement. Levels of disagreement and
modes of expressing disagreement were manipulated by employ-
ing a confederate. Three levels of quantitative disagreement
were pitted against two modes of expressing disagreement:
persistent and acquiescent. Each level of disagreement was
paired with each mode of expression in a 3 x 2 factorial
experiment.
In the experimental situation a naive subject was paired
with a confederate to make a series of judgments concerning
racial integration* Confederates were instructed to disagree
with the naive subject on selected trials. Sixty under-
graduate volunteers were drawn from introductory Psychology
classes; 32 were male and 28 were female. Half of the subjects
were paired with a female confederate and half with a male
confederate. Ten subjects were ran in each of the 6 groups
required by the design*
Results show that variations in both quantity and quality
of disagreement has significant effects on the major dimen-
sions of cognitive conflict. Compromise occurs most frequently
when disagreement is low and expressed in an acquiescent
manner. Maximum yielding to the confederate occurs in the
persistent condition when disagreement is either medium oP
or high* Results also show that cognitive change is maximum
in the medium disagreement condition. No important findings
were obtained for learning.
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